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I. Introduction 
On May 8 2008,Maqbool Fida Hussein, was acquitted by the Delhi 
High Court, in what was considered to be a landmark judgment on 
obscenity.1 The artist had painted „Bharatmata‟ in the nude and had 
at various instances in the past, painted Hindu goddesses in 
obscene postures. The Delhi High Court held that the aesthetics of 
the painting and the social message it carried, far outweighed the 
„obscenity‟ in it. The Bench believed that art ought not to be 
chained by anti-obscenity laws, if it is intended for the welfare of 
society and aimed to convey a social message and not the sexual 
arousal of the audience.  
The judgment states that:  
The ingredients of section 298 Indian Penal Code, 
1860 as alleged are not met since there seems to be 
no deliberate intention on the part of the petitioner 
to hurt feelings of Indians. 
                                                          
*Second Year, BA LLB (Hons.), The W.B. National University of Juridical 
Sciences, Kolkata;shardha.rajam@nujs.edu 
1MF Hussain v. Raj Kumar Pandey, 2008 CrLJ 4107 (Del). 
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Further, Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul concluded that mere 
knowledge of the likelihood that the religious feelings of another 
person may be wounded would not be sufficient. One may 
conclude that this judgment of the Delhi High Court briefly 
captures the mood of the Indian judiciary as a whole, on matters 
pertaining to obscenity; in fact the Supreme Court has mirrored the 
Delhi High Court‟s views and passed renowned judgments 
espousing libertarian thoughts and ideals in the recent past.2 
The boundaries of obscenity have been limited considerably and 
that of speech and literary expression expanded. Yet, a stain in this 
tradition of tolerance is the case of Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar 
v. State of Maharashtra(‘Devidas’)3 wherein, the Apex Court retracted 
its progress and decided that, the work in question would fall 
under the category of „obscene material‟. 
II Facts 
The facts of the case are simple and succinct. The problem began 
when a Marathi poem „Gandhi Mala Bhetala‟, written by Mr. 
Vasant Dattatreya Gujar was published in a magazine meant for 
private circulation amongst members of the All India Bank 
Association Union. Mr. V.V. Anaskar, a member of the „Patit 
Pawan Sangathan‟ found that certain words as well as certain 
phrases used in the poem, were of an offensive nature, and 
therefore merited strict action. These offensive phrases include 
(Translation) “I saw Gandhi masturbating in the memory of Hema 
Malini on a public street; I saw Gandhi at Bhagwan Rajneesh‟s 
meditation session saying satisfaction through sex.” 
He subsequently filed a case under Sections 153-A and 153-B read 
with Section 34, and finally Section 292, Indian Penal Code, 1860 
(IPC). On hearing the facts, the Chief Magistrate, Latur, quashed all 
                                                          
2Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) I SCC 143; Shreya Singhal v. 
Union of India, AIR2015SC1523; Directorate General of Doordarshan v. 
Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 433.  
3Devidas, (2015) 6 SCC 1. 
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charges except the one under Section 292, Indian Penal Code, 1860.4 
Following this, the High Court of Bombay dismissed the matter 
and later, a Special Leave Petition brought the matter to the 
Supreme Court of India.  
The poet‟s defense was that of freedom of speech and expression 
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, as well as 
the explanation that his poem in fact lamented the loss of Gandhian 
values and in no way meant to ridicule him.5 The case took two 
decades for the judgment to be pronounced, at the end of which, 
the Supreme Court rejected the defense of the poet and imposed 
the punishment under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, 
on him. To arrive at this decision, Justice Dipak Misra as well as 
Justice Prafulla C. Pant discussed obscenity cases in India, dating 
back to Ranjit Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra.6 
III. Against Precedents 
With each judgment on obscenity, the Supreme Court has become 
more tolerant, and has recognized the need for art and literature to 
have varied views in the society. The scope of the words „obscenity‟ 
and „immoral‟ have thus narrowed down to an almost ignorable 
category to be used infrequently. After Ranjit Udeshi case7, the Apex 
Court in Chandrakant Kakodkar8 observed that the disputed material 
                                                          
4Using Obscene Language Against Historically Respectable Personalities Cannot 
Be Allowed in the Name of Artistic Freedom, (Dec. 24, 2015) available 
athttp://www.livelaw.in/using-obscene-language-against-historically-
respected-personalities-cannot-be-allowed-in-the-name-of-artistic-
freedom-critical-thinking-or-creativity-sc/ 
5 Mumbai Mirror, My Poem talks about how we have destroyed Gandhi’s 
values, May 16, 2015, available at 
http://www.mumbaimirror.com/mumbai/cover-story/My-poem-talks-
about-how-we-have-destroyed-Gandhis-
values/articleshow/47304204.cms (Dec. 26, 2015). 
6A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 881. 
7Supra note 10. 
8ChandrakantKalyandasKakodkar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 S.C.C. 
687. 
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must be taken as a whole and isolated sentences do not merit the 
offence of obscenity being imposed on it. 
This view emerged once again in the Phoolan Devi case,9 as well as 
in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal.10 In the poem, „Gandhi Mala 
Bhetala‟, there are exactly three sentences which may be included 
in the broadest definition of obscenity. The rest of the poem focuses 
on other incidents encountered by the poet. Thus, on the first count, 
the poem fails the obscenity test as these isolated sentences have 
historically not been recognized as „obscene‟ or immoral as defined 
in the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  
Secondly, where at one point the „Hicklin test‟ or „the most 
vulnerable constituency‟ test was applied,11 today the 
„Contemporary Standards Test‟ is regarded as more suitable.12 
According to the Contemporary Standards Test, the average person 
applying contemporary community standards finds that the subject 
matter taken as a whole, appeals just to the prurient interest and 
lacks serious literary artistic, political, educational or scientific 
value. 
Therefore, the general approach towards obscenity cases in India 
has gradually become more accepting and tolerant. Literary and 
artistic freedom of expression has time and again been regarded as 
necessary and therefore encouraged by the judiciary. In Raj Kapoor 
and Others v. State and Others,13 India‟s heritage was cited as proof 
of its historical tolerance. The bench stated: 
The world‟s greatest paintings, sculptures, songs 
and dances, India‟s lustrous heritage, the Konaraks 
and Khajurahos, lofty epics, luscious in patches, may 
                                                          
9 The State of Bihar v. Shailabala Devi, 1952 A.I.R. 329. 
10Aveek Sarkar, 2005 (2) C.H.N. 694. 
11MADHAVIGORADIA DIVAN, FACETS OF MEDIA LAW, 80, (Eastern Book 
Company,  2nd ed. 2013); RanjitUdeshiv. State of Maharahstra, A.I.R. 1965 
S.C. 881. 
12Director General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 S.C.C. 
433. 
13 1980 A.I.R. 258. 
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be asphyxiated by law, if prudes and prigs and State 
moralists prescribe paradigms and proscribe 
heterodoxies. It is plain that the procedural issue is 
important and the substantive issue portentous. 
 In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India14, the bench decided that “The 
standards that we set for our censors must make a substantial 
allowance in favor of freedom thus leaving a vast area for creative 
art to interpret life and society with some of its foibles along with 
what is good” 
In Gajanan Vishveshwar Birjur v. Union of India15, the Court observed 
that the Constitution of India permits a free trade in ideas and 
ideologies and guarantees freedom of thought and expression. The 
Court further observed, that thought control is alien to our 
constitutional scheme. The freedom enshrined in Article 19 of the 
Indian Constitution is recognized to include the freedom to offend, 
disturb and shock the society, in order to question accepted 
morals.16 In K.A. Abbas,17 the constitutional bench famously 
observed that „Hicklin test‟ should be discarded, as the quality of a 
material ought not to be judged by weak minded people. 
The bench states:  
If the depraved begin to see in these things more 
than what an average person would, in much the 
same way, as it is wrongly said, a Frenchman sees a 
woman‟s legs in everything, it cannot be helped. Sex 
and obscenity are not always synonymous and it is 
wrong to classify sex as essentially obscene or even 
indecent or immoral. 
The Indian judiciary has therefore consistently used other 
yardsticks which prove to be better fits. In later cases, the Supreme 
Court recognized the need to expand the scope of the test for 
                                                          
14 (1970) 2 S.C.C. 780. 
151994 S.C.C. (5) 550. 
16Khushboo v. Kaniammal,(2010) 5 SCC 3346. 
17K.A.Abbas v. Union of India and Another, (1970) 2 SCC 780. 
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obscenity and exempted literary and artistic works carrying social 
or moral messages.  
In Samresh Bose & Anr. V. Amal Mitra &Anr.,18 it was observed that 
the work in question had great social and moral value, and 
therefore, merited the acquittal of the author. In another prominent 
case, Ajay Goswami v. Union of India19 , the bench once again laid 
stress on the need to be more tolerant and view the message that a 
material carried, before imposing Section 292 of the Indian Penal 
Code, 1860 on it. The court observed that:  
No news item should be viewed or read in isolation. 
It is necessary that a publication must be judged as a 
whole and news items, advertisements or passages 
should not be read without the accompanying 
message that is purported to be conveyed to the 
public. Also, the members of the public and readers 
should not look for meanings in a picture or written 
article, which are not conceived to be conveyed 
through the picture or the news item. 
The argument regarding the social message of a particular work, 
gained much recognition in the Phoolan Devi case20 and in Aveek 
Sarkar,21 as well. It was further observed, “The photograph has no 
tendency to deprave or corrupt the minds of the people because the 
said picture has to be viewed in the background in which it was 
shown and the message it has to convey to the public and the 
world at large.”At the same time, the readers and viewers were 
advised to not look for meanings in a picture or written article, 
which are not conceived to be conveyed through the picture or the 
news item.  
In the present case, the Supreme Court conveniently ignored the 
social message the poem carries that is, by mocking Gandhi, the 
poet shows the dilution of Gandhian ideals in the society. This 
                                                          
18Samresh Bose, 1986 A.I.R. 967. 
19(2007) 1 S.C.C. 143. 
20Supra note 11. 
21Supra note 11. 
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message is not considered by the Court, while applying the 
„Contemporary Standards Test‟. Apart from these errors, in 
Devidas22 , the Supreme Court makes one more observation. The 
judgment applies the law incorrectly and has no constitutional 
basis. There is no mention of „historically respectable personality‟ 
as a category, in the Indian constitution. On the other hand, Article 
14 expressly states that all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law. 
The „Contemporary Standards Test‟ is wrongly applied in the case 
when Justice Mishra states in ¶105 of Devidas23 : 
…the concept of „degree‟ comes in. To elaborate, the 
„contemporary community standards test‟ becomes 
applicable with more vigor, in a greater degree and 
in an accentuated manner.  
The Contemporary Community Standards test, however, does not 
mention „degree‟. It is a uniform, objective test, which is applied, 
irrespective of who the material speaks against. In this case, one 
can thus, see a misapplication of a generally well accepted principle 
of law.  
IV. Obscenity as defined by the majority 
In Aveek Sarkar24, it was decided that the Hicklin test was to be 
substituted by the Community Standards Test. Despite the 
laudable and progressive approach taken by the Apex Court in 
deciding this case, the bench applied the Roth judgment25 in a 
limited fashion. In its purest form, the Roth test is a three pronged 
test to examine a material which is, that the material has to be 
obscene according to the community‟s standard of accepted morals 
(the community standards test), thereafter it must be patently 
offensive, and finally, the material must fulfill no social purpose.26 
                                                          
22 Supra note 5. 
23Supra note 5. 
24Supra note 27. 
25 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
26Gautam Bhatia, Obscenity: The Supreme Court discards the Hicklin test, 
available at   
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In Aveek Sarkar27 however, the second and final part of this test has 
been left out. In doing so, today, the Indian system of law is left 
with a vague majoritarian concept of what is acceptable in society- 
the community standards test eliminates all kind of minority 
opinion and literary expression, by keeping the community‟s 
acceptance as the test for judging the quality of a material. 
However, the concept of social value and purpose (explained as the 
third prong of the Roth test) has come to light in several later cases. 
In Samresh Bose &Anr. v. Amal Mitra & Anr.28 , the said witness 
deposed that the novel has „great social and moral value‟.  
In Khushboo v. Kaniammal29, the court unambiguously stated the 
importance of free speech to churn society. This landmark 
judgment advised the respondent to challenge the views that she 
found unacceptable in the public forum or through the media. The 
court held that: 
If the complainants vehemently disagreed with the 
appellant‟s views, then they should have contested 
her views through the news media or any other 
public platform. The law should not be used in a 
manner that has chilling effects on the freedom of 
speech and expression. An expression of opinion in 
favor of non-dogmatic and non- conventional 
morality has to be tolerated as the same cannot be a 
ground to penalize the author. 
Moreover, it was opined that the very utility of free speech arose 
from its power „to offend, shock or disturb‟ the society 
we must lay stress on the need to tolerate unpopular 
views in the socio-cultural space. 
                                                                                                                                    
https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2014/02/07/obscenity-the-
supreme-court-discards-the-hicklin-test/(Dec. 25, 2015). 
27Supra note 27. 
28 1986 A.I.R. 967. 
29 (2010) 5 S.C.C. 3346. 
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In Ajay Goswami30, it was held that the material in question must 
not be held in isolation, ergo the message it carried ought to be 
given value while judging it. Yet, in Devidas, using the 
contemporary community standards test, the Court essentially 
propagates the view that if the majority of the society does not 
accept the literary work in question, then it is deemed to be 
obscene.  
The test used by the bench in Devidas is not accepted by many 
scholars even if it is applied correctly. Scholars, argue that this test 
ought to be done away with, as it essentially believes that a 
minority is wrong merely because it is not acceptable to the 
majority.31 It promotes uniformity of thought and does not allow 
scope for differences in the perception of what constitutes „morally 
right‟ behavior and conversely, what is „obscene‟. Juxtaposing this 
principle with the judgment of Khushboo v. Kanniammal,32 one 
begins to understand the paradox posed by the apex court in 
Devidas33. 
It is perceptible that by making certain respectable persons „off 
limits‟ for the public, the Court adds to the cult around national 
leaders. The hypersensitivity of the judiciary in this matter is 
therefore, a reflection of the paranoia of the executive. Keeping the 
public impervious to the flaws of their leaders and treating the 
leaders as divinity surely subdues dissent. In Devidas34, it is evident 
that the judiciary is seeking to protect the Mahatma. In order to 
retain the purity of Gandhi‟s image, the bench creates a legal fiction 
which first arrives at a conclusion and then attempts to find reasons 
to justify it. Subsequently, the bench in no uncertain terms declares 
that the aura around Gandhi must not be meddled with.35 
                                                          
30Ajay Goswami v. Union of India & Others, A.I.R. 2007 S.C. 493. 
31Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, (2006) 8 
S.C.C. 433.  
32Khushboo, (2010) 5 S.C.C. 3346. 
33Supra note 5. 
34Supra note 5. 
35 At ¶105, Misra J. in Devidas.  
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The cult following of the Mahatma was and continues to be 
popular in India and this seems to be the driving factor of the 
verdict.36 As one probes deeper, one realizes that the bench does 
not stop at Mahatma Gandhi, but leaves scope for other people to 
be included in the „historically respectable personalities‟ category. 
By using this qualification of historical respectability, the judiciary 
in essence is protecting most of the erstwhile parliamentarians and 
national leaders from scathing remarks of the public. Without any 
definition of the term or even providing a list of persons included 
in the list, the judiciary leaves a wide loophole for society‟s less 
tolerant to exploit. 
 It adds to the portrayal of our national leaders as towering 
personalities, inherently invulnerable and flawless. The protection 
afforded to Gandhi appears to be undue, as the poet himself states 
that his work does not ridicule Gandhi. In fact, the poet laments the 
erosion of Gandhian values in the post Emergency era, with 
allusions to anarchy and a society with feeble ideals.37 Ideally, this 
should have acquitted him as it would fall squarely within the 
scope of the „preponderating literary merit‟ test for adjudging 
obscenity.38 
V. Conclusion 
Gandhi‟s wish to be born as an untouchable in his next life has 
indeed been fulfilled. The words - “But if I were to be reborn, I 
should be an untouchable…”  in the context of the Devidas39 
                                                          
36First Post, Fan Bhakti is killing Indian democracy, April 1, 2013, available at 
http://www.firstpost.com/politics/political-fan-bhakti-is-killing-indian-
democracy-681794.html  (Dec. 25, 2015). 
37 Mumbai Mirror, My Poem talks about how we have destroyed Gandhi’s 
values, May 16, 2015, available at 
http://www.mumbaimirror.com/mumbai/cover-story/My-poem-talks-
about-how-we-have-destroyed-Gandhis-
values/articleshow/47304204.cms (Dec. 25, 2015). 
38Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Ananda Patwardhan, (2006) 8 S.C.C. 
433. 
39Supra note 5. 
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judgment, delivered by the Supreme Court, which argues for the 
creation of a separate category of „historically respectable 
personalities,‟ has virtually made Gandhi and his like, untouchable 
by the common public. Essentially, such historical personalities 
cannot be used in any form of art that degrades them – even if they 
represent something beyond themselves in the literary work. 
Religion and national leaders, the two invincible components of a 
society, seethe with intolerance, at the mere hint of mockery. The 
Delhi High court‟s judgment on MF Hussain‟s artwork even 
brought religion to the public forum for discussion. It is despicable 
if the Supreme Court cannot keep up the tradition and leaves 
national leaders invulnerable. 
